Gilbert Capson and Linda Capson, His Wife v. A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete Company : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Gilbert Capson and Linda Capson, His Wife v. A. J.
Dean Ready Mix Concrete Company : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Timothy R. Hanson; Attorney for RespondentBoyd M. Fullmer;
Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Capson v. Dean, No. 15431 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/863
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT CAPSON and LINDA ) 
CAPSON, his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) CASE NO. 15431 
) 
A. J. DEAN READY MIX CON- ) 
CRETE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Honorable David B. Dee, Judge 
Boyd M. Fullmer 
FULLMER & HARDING 
530 East 500 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
Timothy R. Hanson 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondent 
F ~ l ED 
FEB -6 1978 
................ ________________________ ,. __ _ 
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
cases Cited. . 
Statutes Cited 
~ATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATDIENT OF FACTS 
ARGUME:'IT • 
POET I THE UTAH WORKMA.~ COMPENSATION 
LAWS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT PRECLUDE 
A.~ ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT REA-
DY MIX CO. 
POINT II - THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF LINDA 
CAPSON AS TO HER CLAIM OF CON-
SORTIUM AND FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT 
Page 
ii 
ii 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
A.~D MEDICAL EXPENSES. 14 
CO.'!CLUSION .•• 17 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 
29 U.2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973). 
Corbridge v. M. Morrin & Son, Inc. 19 
U.2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). 
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 U.2d 143, 493 
P.2d 985 (1972) . 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U.2d 139, 
442 p. 2d 31 (1968). . . 
Leonard Construction Company v. State 
Tax Commission, 539 P.2d 246 
(Idaho 1975). . . .... 
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 U.2d 159, 493 
P.2d 997 (1972) 
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 U.2d 366, 510 
P. 2d 52 3 (1973) . 
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Company, 546 
Page 
8' 9' 13 
16' 17 
15' 16 
7' 13 
12 
7' 8' 13 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). . . . . . .... 10, 12, 18 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
30-2-4. 
35-1-42 
35-1-60 
35-1-62 
68-3-3 •.......•.......... 
15' 16 
4' 5' 6' 7 
8' 10 
3 ' 5 ' 7' 12 
5' 6' 7' 8 
9, 10, 12 
14, 17 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT CAPSON and LINDA ) 
CAP SON, his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
) 
A. J. DEAN READY MIX CON- ) Case No. 15431 
CRETE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff, Gilbert Capson 
against defendant A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete Company for 
damages arising from a trench cave-in. In addition, plain-
tiff Linda Capson has sued defendant for loss of consortium 
and for medical and family expenses incurred by her on behalf 
of her husband. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by 
the Honorable David Dee on September 13, 1977 as to all 
claims by both plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court 
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order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants in their statement of facts have 2:reatly · ~ s1m-
plified the procedural aspects of this case. This case was 
first filed in 1974. It has been reviewed and ruled upon by 
a number of District Court J·udges and by this Court 1·n a pre-
vious appeal. The following is a brief outline of the pro-
cedural path this litigation has taken. 
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint on September 9, 
1974 alleging that plaintiff Gilbert Capson suffered damages 
in the amount of $102 ,000 as a result of negligence caused 
by two Utah corporations - -A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete Com-
pany (hereinafter Ready Mix Co.) and Arctic Circle, Inc. 
In addition, plaintiff Linda Capson claimed $5 ,000 for loss 
of her husband's services and for support of her husband and 
family. This complaint consisted of three separate causes 
of action. (R., pp. l-4). 
Defendant Ready Mix filed an answer to plaintiff's com· 
plaint on October 15, 1974. (R., pp. 7-9). The other defen· 
dant, Arctic Circle Inc., filed a motion to dismiss on October 
10, 1974 on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. (R., pp. 15-16). Subsequently, 
defendant Ready Mix Co. filed its motion to dismiss upon the 
same grounds. (R., p. 28). 
-2-
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-on December 22, 1975 the Honorable Bryant H. Cr~ft 
granted both motions to dismiss but gave leave to amend 
plaintiffs' complaint. (R., pp. 31-32). Accordingly, a se-
cond amended complaint was filed by plaintiffs on January 9, 
1976 identical to the original complaint except that a 
fourth cause of action was added claiming that plaintiff 
Gilbert Capson was employed by Arctic Circle and was there-
fore entitled to receive medical expenses and unemployment 
benefits from defendant Arctic Circle. Also, plaintiff Linda 
Capson sought reimbursement for money expended by her for 
medical expenses and maintenance of the family. (R., pp. 
33-40). 
Once again, defendant Arctic Circle moved to dismiss the 
second complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief 
could be granted and failure of the court to have jurisdic-
tion over the controversy. (R., pp. 41-42). Defendant Ready 
Mix filed an answer to the second amended complaint alleging 
affirmatively, inter alia, that plaintiffs were barred from 
bringing such action because of the provisions of Section 
35-1-60 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. (R., pp. 43-45). 
Defendant Arctic Circle's motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint was granted by the Honorable James Sawaya on March 
1, 1976. (R., pp. 50-51). Plaintiffs appealed from this 
order of dismissal. (R., p. 52). 
- 3-
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Pending the Arctic Circle appeal defendant Ready Mix 
moved for a dismissal. This motion was denied by the Honor-
able Marcellus K. Snow. (R., p. 59). 
On November 4, 1976 this Court published its decision 
concerning the Arctic Circle appeal. (R., pp. 64-65; 556 
P.2d 505). Justice Henriod in speaking for a unanimous court 
held that plaintiffs' complaint showed that Gilbert Capson was 
a subcontractor working under the direction and control of 
Arctic Circle Inc. This Court ruled that under Title 35-1-42 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, plaintiff became an employee of 
Arctic Circle and was therefore precluded from bringing a 
suit against it and that Capson's remedy was provided by 
Workman 1 s Compensation. The lower court ·decision was affirmed, 
On August 17, 19 77 defendant Ready Mix Co. moved for a 
summary judgment based upon this Court's decision in the Arc· 
tic Circle case. On September 13, 1977 the Honorable David 
Dee granted defendant Ready Mix' s motion for summary judgment 
against both plaintiffs. (R., pp. 97-98). From this order 
the present appeal is taken. (R., p. 99). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH WORKMAN COMPENSATION LAWS IN 
EFFECT AT THE TI:ME OF PLAINTIFF'S ACCI-
DENT PRECLUDES AN ACTION AGAINST DEFEN-
DANT READY MIX CO. 
The accident in this case occurred on July 26, 1972. As 
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:uch, any claims arising out of this accident were controlled 
by the law then in effect. Section 35-1-42 in part states: 
Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is 
a part or a process in the trade or busi-
ness of the employer, such contractor, 
and all persons employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any such subcontractors, shall 
be deemed, within the meaning of this-sec=-
tion, employees of such original employer. 
(Emphasis added). 
section 35-1-60 provides an exclusive remedy against an em-
ployer, or officer, agent or employee of an employer. This 
section states in part the following: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant 
to the provisions of this title for inJuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting 
in death or not, shall be the exclusive re-
medy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent 
or employee of the employer and the liabili-
ties of the employer imposed by this act 
shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liabilities whatsoever. (Emphasis added). 
Section 35-1-62 addressed itself to injuries or death 
caused by wrongful acts of third parties. This section in 
1972 stated: 
When any inJury or death for which compen-
sation is payable under this title shall 
have been caused by the wrongful act or ne-
glect of another person not in the same em-
ployment, the injured employee, or in the 
case of death his dependents, may claim com-
pensation and the injured employee or his 
heirs or principal representative may also 
have an action for damages against such third 
person. (Emphasis added). 
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Section 35-1-62 was subsequently amended by the 1975 le . gis-
la ture in which the term "same employment" was omitted and 
language speaking in terms of "employer" or "employee of 
said employer" was substituted. In addition, the following 
paragraph was added: 
For the purpose of this section and not-
withstanding the provisions of Section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his 
heirs or personal representative may also 
maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, in-
dependent contractors, property owners or 
their lessees or assigns, not occupying 
an employee-employer relationship with 
the injured or deceased employee at the 
time of his injury or death. 
This statutory scheme in effect during 19 72, this Court's 
decisions interpreting such statutes, and the pleadings of 
the plaintiffs conclusively establish that the trial court 
was correct in granting judgment in favor of defendant Ready 
Mix Co. 
As noted by this Court in the previous appeal, plain· 
tiffs' own pleadings allege that Arctic Circle, Inc., the 
general contractor, was the employer of plaintiff Gilbert Cap· 
son as defined in Section 35-1-42. Such pleadings also show 
that defendant Ready Mix Co. was acting under the control of 
Arctic Circle Inc. and was therefore a subcontractor of Arc· 
tic Circle at the time of the accident. See plaintiff's se· 
cond amended complaint. (R., pp. 33-39 and appellant 1 s brief, 
pp. 3-6). 
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Thus, it is agreed by the parties that both plaintiff 
Capson and defendant Ready Mix were subcontractors and there-
by each became a "statutory employee" of the general contractor 
Arctic Circle as defined by Section 35-1-42, U. C. A. 
Appellants contend that even though this relationship ex-
isted under Section 35-1-42 this status is not controlling 
for purposes of Section 35-1-60 and 35-1-62 for determining 
"same employment". (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-7). However, 
the law existing at the time of plaintiff's accident is con-
trary to appellant's position. This Court in several de-
cisions clearly held that statutory employees were precluded 
from suing the employer or other "statutory employees." 
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U.2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968) 
an employee of a general contractor sued the owner of a truck 
for injuries sustained by the employee. This Court concluded 
that the defendant in that case was acting under the control 
and direction of the general contractor and as such was an em-
ployee of the plaintiff's employer. This Court stated: 
We, therefore hold that the defendant was 
an employee of Gibbons and Reed Company 
within the meaning of Section 35-1-42, 
U.C.A., 1953. This being so, the plain-
tiff must look to Workman's Compensation 
insurance coverage and is prevented by 
Section 35-1-60 from suing the defendant 
in this case. 442 P.2d at 34. 
In 1972 this Court in Peterson v. Fowler, 27 U.2d 159, 
493 P.2d 997 (1972) held that an employee of a general con-
-7-
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tractor could not maintain an action against b a su contractor 
"in the same employment" as the general contractor. Justice 
Ellett in a unanimous decision clearly defined the meaning 
of "same employment": 
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged 
in the same line of work and labor together 
in such personal relations that they can 
exercise an influence upon each other pro-
motive of proper caution in respect of their 
mutual safety. They should be at the time 
of the injury directly operating with each 
other in the particular business at hand, or 
they must be operating so that mutual duties 
bring them into such co-association that they 
may exercise an influence upon each other to 
use proper caution and be so situated in their 
labor to some extent as to be able to super-
vise and watch the conduct of each other as 
to skill, diligence, and carefulness. When 
workmen are so engaged, we think they are 
working in the same employment. 493 P.2d at 
1000. (Emphasis added). 
In Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 U.2d286, 
508 P.2d 805 (1973) this Court again established the rela-
tionship between Sections 35-1-42 and 35-1-62. In the 
Adamson case an employee of a subcontractor attempted to sue 
the general contractor. This Court held that Section 35-1-42 
automatically made the plaintiff's employer (the subcontrac· 
tor) an employee of the general contractor and as such the 
plaintiff was precluded from maintaining an action against 
the general contractor since he was then in the "same employ· 
ment" as the defendant as enumerated in Section 35-1-62. This 
Court in the Adamson case also made a pertinent statement as 
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to the purpose of a Workman Compensation Act and its appli-
cation. The Court said: 
[T]he purpose of the Act is to provide 
speedy and certain compensation for work-
men and their dependents and to avoid the 
delay, expense and uncertainty which were 
involved prior to the Act; and the concomi-
tant purpose of protecting the employer 
from the hazards of exorbitant and in some 
instances perhaps ruinous liabilities. 
Those principles are applicable here and 
correlated to them is the proposition that 
the Act should be liberally construed and 
applied to provide coverage and effectuate 
those purposes. 508 P.2d at 807. 
In Peterson v. Fowler, 29 U.2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973) 
this Court decided the second appeal involving the death of 
the general contractor's employee caused by a fall in a 
sports arena. In the first appeal this Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the subcontractor on grounds that it was in the 
same employment as the decedent's employer and therefore was 
protected from suit by Section 35-1-62. In the second case 
several other defendants had been granted summary judgments 
by the trial court. This Court held that two of the three 
defendants were materialmen to the subcontractor and were 
therefore not in the "same employment" as the decedent. How-
ever, the Court sustained the motion for summary judgment as 
to these defendants on the grounds there was no evidence 
showing any negligence on their part. 
Appellants' assertion that defendant Ready Mix Co. was 
a materialman to this project and not in the "same employment" 
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as plaintiffs (appellants' brief, pp. 6-7) is without merit 
in view of plaintiffs' own pleadings in the complaint and 
the undisputed fact throughout this appeal that Ready Mix 
Co. was a subcontractor of Arctic Circle. For example, 
appellants clearly state this fact in their brief when they 
say, "We have a subcontractor bringing suit against another 
subcontractor". (Appellants 1 brief, p. 5). Thus, any "ma-
terialman" distinction raised by appellants is completely 
inapplicable to the facts and pleadings of this case. 
The final and perhaps most controlling case is Shupe v. 
Wasatch Electric Company, 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). In that 
case the survivors of a deceased workman who was an employee 
of the general contractor sued a subcontractor for alleged 
negligence in causing the employee's death. The accident 
occurred on July 19, 1974. 
This Court held that at the time of the accident Secti~ 
35-1-42 placed the employee in the same employment as the 
subcontractor and thus no cause of action was permissible. 
This Court acknowledged the 1975 amendment to Section 
35-1-62 and stated the following:. 
The legislature, undoubtedly being aware 
of the decisions of this Court construing 
the terms "same employment" in 1975 amended 
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953 by adding the 
following provision: 
"For the purposes of this section 
and notwithstanding the provisions 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Section 35-1-42 the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also maintain 
an action for damages against sub-
contractors, general contractors, 
independent contractors, property 
owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer 
relationship with the injured or 
deceased employee at the time of 
his injury or death." 
The amendment if applicable would leave the 
plaintiffs in Court. Id. at 898. (Empha-
sis added). 
This Court rejected a retroactive application of the 
amended statute. Citing Section 68-3-3, U.C.A., 1953 as au-
thority this Court stated the following: 
The amendment above referred to provides 
a cause of action on behalf of an injured 
workman against individuals not covered 
by the statute prior to its amendment. 
To apply the statute retroactively would 
compel a new class of individuals to as-
sume risks which did not exist prior to 
the amendment, and we are of the opinion 
that retroactive application would deny 
equal protection to a new class brought 
within the terms of the statute as amended 
so as to deprive them of equal protections 
of the laws. Id. at 898. 
Appellants throughout their brief argue that it is unfair 
to make the persons who are employees under 35-1-42 persons of 
the same employment under 35-1-62 and that appellants cannot 
imagine any situation in which any class working on the same 
job could sue another class working on that job. (Appellants' 
brief, p. 6). Obviously, the arguments advanced by appellants 
-11-
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in their brief and by Justice Maughn's dissent in the Shu~ 
decision had persuasive weight on the 1975 legislature which 
amended Section 35-1-62 to prevent a statutory employee from 
being automatically deemed an "employee" for purposes of 
Sections 35-1-60 and 35-1-62. 
However, the very fact of amendment shows that the prior 
statute in effect at the time of the accident included a sta-
tutory employee in the "same employment" category. It is a 
well-established rule of statutory construction that when t~ 
legislature amends a statute it is presumed to have been in· 
tended that the statute have a different meaning than it had 
prior to the amendment and such amendment indicates not only 
the intention of the new law but also that of the old. Leo· 
nard Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 539 P.Zd 
246 (Idaho 1975). 
Thus, had plaintiff been injured in an accident after t~ , 
effective date of the 1975 amendment it is probable, just as 
in the Shupe case, that plaintiffs "would be left in court". 
However, because this accident occurred prior to that amend· 
ment the old statutory language and the applicable common law 
created by this Court must apply. 
Using this criteria there can be no question that both 
plaintiffs and defendant Ready Mix Co. were subcontractors of 
the general contractor Arctic Circle and were therefore co· 
-12-
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employees pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-1-42. 
The Gallegos case and the Adamson case clearly established 
the proposition that an employee under Section 35-1-42 is 
deemed a person of the same employment for purposes of Sec-
tion 35-1-62. Appellant's own pleadings establish the em-
ployee status of plaintiff Capson and defendant Ready Mix Co. 
which standing alone is sufficient to divest the District 
Court of jurisdiction. As stated by this Court in the pre-
vious appeal: 
The record does not reflect that he pur-
sued anything or any procedure, dis-
covery, or otherwise, that would over-
come his own pleaded statements or ad-
missions of an employer-employee rela-
tionship or substantiate his urgence for 
the first time on appeal, of any debata-
ble issue as to whether he was or was not 
an employee in the Workman's Compensation 
sense of the term. 556 P.2d at 506. 
Aside from the statutory employee status, however, it 
is obvious that plaintiff Capson was in the "same employment" 
as Ready Mix when the activity surrounding the accident is 
examined in light of the standards enumerated by this Court 
in the first Peterson appeaL 
Plaintiffs in their complaint alleged that Gilbert Cap-
son has prepared the forms in the excavation of the building 
and that defendant Ready Mix Co. was engaged in pouring ce-
ment into the forms at the time of the accident. (R.' pp. 
1-2). Certainly the operator of defendant's cement truck and 
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plaintiff Cap son were at the time of the injury "directly 
operating with each other in the particular business at hand" 
and were able to "exercise an influence upon each other to 
use proper caution and be so situated in their labor to some 
extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of 
each other as to skill, diligence, and carefulness." 493 
P.Zd at 1000. Therefore, even under the common law termin-
ology of fellow servants it is apparent that plaintiff and 
defendant were "in the same employment" at the time of the 
accident and plaintiff was therefore precluded by the then 
existing Section 35-1-62 from maintaining an action against 
Ready Mix Co. 
For the preceding reasons the trial court was correct 
in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and hold-
ing that the prior statutory law precluded a suit against 
defendant Ready Mix Co. by plaintiff Gilbert Capson. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDG-
MENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF LINDA CAPSON AS 
TO HER CLAIM OF CONSORTIUM AND FOR LOSS 
OF SUPPORT AND MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
Plaintiffs 1 second amended complaint alleged that plain· 
tiff Linda Capson sustained "great and irreparable harm in 
that she will be deprived of the services and support of her 
husband and she will continue to be so permanently deprived 
of the comfort and solace usually and ordinarily provided by 
-14-
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a husband in good health and unimpaired vigor." (R., p. 35). 
This language clearly speaks in terms of a claim for 
loss of consortium. This Court has conclusively established 
that such a claim is invalid under Utah law. In Ellis v. 
Hathaway, 27 U.2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972) a wife sought to 
recover for claimed loss of support, companionship, love and 
affection because of injuries which her husband received in 
an automobile accident. This Court stated: 
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. The hus-
band was driving the car. He sued for in-
juries which he claims he received to his 
neck. The wife sued for claimed loss of 
support, companionship, love, and affection. 
She does not call it consortium. 
The wife has no basis for her action. At 
common law she could not sue for loss of 
consortium, and under the Married Women's 
Act no cause of action was given to her for 
negligent injury to her husband. Our sta-
tute placed husband and wife on an equal 
basis by saying: ". . . There shall be no 
right of recovery by the husband on account 
of personal injury or wrong to his wife ... " 
(Citation to Section 30-2-4, U.C.A., 1953). 
In light of the Ellis decision, the trial court was correct 
in granting judgment against Linda Capson for her claims of 
loss of consortium. 
The trial court was equally correct in granting judgment 
against plaintiff Linda Capson for her claim of loss of sup-
port and medical expenses arising therefrom. Plaintiff's 
amended complaint stated the following: 
-15-
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That plaintiff Linda Capson has also been 
damaged in that she has had to provide 
from her own funds for the payment of medi-
cal expenses and the support of the family 
of Gilbert Capson in the sum of approxi-
mately $18,000 and that she is thereby dam-
aged in said sum. (R., p. 35). 
As stated in the Ellis opinion supra, a wife has no 
cause of action for negligent injury to her husband. Plain-
tiff Linda Capson is seeking to recover for medical expenses 
and expenses for support of her family resulting from her 
husband's injury. Only her husband has a cause of action for 
these alleged damages. 
This Court in Corbridge v. M. Morrin & Son, Inc. 19 U.Zd 
409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967) faced an analogous situation where a 
husband was attempting to recover for his own lost wages and 
expenses from missing work to provide care for his children 
while his wife recovered from injuries which she sustained 
from falling into an excavation. In affirming the summary 
judgment of the District Court against the husband this Court 
relied upon Section 30-2-4 U.C.A., 1953 for the premise that 
since a husband and wife were placed by the legislature on an 
equal basis that neither spouse can recover for expenses in· 
curred as a result of injuries to the other spouse. This 
Court in Corbridge stated: 
The wife, (husband in the instant case) if 
anybody, should recover the expenses incurred 
in connection with her injuries. The rea-
sonable value of the services which she was 
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unable to perform as a result of her in-
juries and which she otherwise would have 
performed would be part of her recovery 
if any she is entitled to. (Parentheses 
added). 
In addition, even if Linda Capson had a cause of action 
for these damages, which she clearly does not as stated in 
Corbridge, her husband is already seeking recovery for these 
same damages and any recovery by her would be duplicitous. 
Thus, the trial court properly granted judgment against 
Linda Capson for her claims alleged in the amended complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that Utah law applicable 
to this accident precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action 
against defendant Ready Mix Co. This Court's previous deci-
sions and the language of these statutes establish that plain-
tiff, as a subcontractor of Arctic Circle, Inc., and defen-
dant, as a subcontractor of Arctic Circle Inc., were both 
employees of Arctic Circle and were necessarily in the "same 
employment" as specified in Section 35-1-62; In addition, 
under the standards of this Court in the Peterson case plain-
tiff and defendant's agent would be deemed fellow servants 
under common law because of the type of work being done at 
the time of the injury. 
While it may be true as appellants point out in their 
brief that it is unfair not to allow one subcontractor on a 
job to sue another this unfairness is and was a question for 
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the legislature and not for this Court. The 1975 amendment 
passed by the Utah legislature obviously eliminated this un-
fairness, if any, existing under the prior law but did so 
only as to prospective injuries. 
This Court in the Shupe case has already ruled that the 
statute should not be applied retroactively because it would 
deny equal protection of the laws to those people in the 
class existing before the amendment and to those people af-
ter the amendment. Appellants must be bound by this deci-
sion just as were the plaintiffs in Shupe. 
Finally, the claims raised by plaintiff Linda Capson 
are clearly without merit in that both loss of consortium 
and expenses incurred for family support and medical expen· 
ses are not recoverable under Utah law. 
For these reasons the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAi'JSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
,/ - ___ _,------
I ~ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
~02 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, ,Utah 84101 
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